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U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government�s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 �30 ����ӡ 2013�� ������ �07:35 ������ U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government�s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 The United States Government assesses with high confidence that theSyrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbson August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in theattack. These all-source assessments are based on human, signals, andgeospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of open sourcereporting.Our classified assessments have been shared with the U.S. Congressand key international partners. To protect sources and methods, we cannotpublicly release all available intelligence � but what follows is anunclassified summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community�s analysis of what tookplace. Syrian Government Use ofChemical Weapons on August 21 A large body of independentsources indicates that a chemical weapons attack took place in the Damascussuburbs on August 21. In addition to U.S. intelligence information, there areaccounts from international and Syrian medical personnel; videos; witnessaccounts; thousands of social media reports from at least 12 differentlocations in the Damascus area; journalist accounts; and reports from highlycredible nongovernmental organizations. A preliminary U.S. governmentassessment determined that 1,429 people were killed in the chemical weaponsattack, including at least 426 children, though this assessment will certainlyevolve as we obtain more information. We assess with high confidencethat the Syrian government carried out the chemical weapons attack againstopposition elements in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. We assess that thescenario in which the opposition executed the attack on August 21 is highlyunlikely. The body of information used to make this assessment includesintelligence pertaining to the regime�s preparations for this attack and itsmeans of delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself andits effect, our post-attack observations, and the differences between thecapabilities of the regime and the opposition. Our high confidence assessmentis the strongest position that the U.S. Intelligence Community can take shortof confirmation. We will continue to seek additional information to close gapsin our understanding of what took place. 2 Background: The Syrian regime maintains astockpile of numerous chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and hasthousands of munitions that can be used to deliver chemical warfare agents. Syrian President Bashar al-Asadis the ultimate decision maker for the chemical weapons program and members ofthe program are carefully vetted to ensure security and loyalty. The SyrianScientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) � which is subordinate to theSyrian Ministry of Defense � manages Syria�s chemical weapons program. We assess with high confidencethat the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale against theopposition multiple times in the last year, including in the Damascus suburbs.This assessment is based on multiple streams of information including reportingof Syrian officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks andlaboratory analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number ofindividuals, which revealed exposure to sarin. We assess that the oppositionhas not used chemical weapons. The Syrian regime has the typesof munitions that we assess were used to carry out the attack on August 21, andhas the ability to strike simultaneously in multiple locations. We have seen noindication that the opposition has carried out a large-scale, coordinatedrocket and artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21. We assess that the Syrianregime has used chemical weapons over the last year primarily to gain the upperhand or break a stalemate in areas where it has struggled to seize and holdstrategically valuable territory. In this regard, we continue to judge that theSyrian regime views chemical weapons as one of many tools in its arsenal,including air power and ballistic missiles, which they indiscriminately useagainst the opposition. The Syrian regime has initiatedan effort to rid the Damascus suburbs of opposition forces using the area as abase to stage attacks against regime targets in the capital. The regime hasfailed to clear dozens of Damascus neighborhoods of opposition elements,including neighborhoods targeted on August 21, despite employing nearly all ofits conventional weapons systems. We assess that the regime�s frustration withits inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to itsdecision to use chemical weapons on August 21. Preparation: We have intelligence that leadsus to assess that Syrian chemical weapons personnel � including personnelassessed to be associated with the SSRC � were preparing chemical munitionsprior to the attack. In the three days prior to the attack, we collectedstreams of human, signals and geospatial intelligence that reveal regimeactivities that we assess were associated with preparations for a chemicalweapons attack. Syrian chemical weaponspersonnel were operating in the Damascus suburb of �Adra from Sunday, August 18until early in the morning on Wednesday, August 21 near an area that the regimeuses to mix chemical weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a Syrian regimeelement prepared for a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus area, includingthrough the utilization of gas masks. Our intelligence sources in the Damascusarea did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack thatopposition affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons. The Attack: Multiple streams ofintelligence indicate that the regime executed a rocket and artillery attackagainst the Damascus suburbs in the early hours of August 21. Satellite detectionscorroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoodswhere the chemical attacks reportedly occurred � including Kafr Batna, Jawbar,�Ayn Tarma, Darayya, and Mu�addamiyah. This includes the detection of rocketlaunches from regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately90 minutes before the first report of a chemical attack appeared in socialmedia. The lack of flight activity or missile launches also leads us toconclude that the regime used rockets in the attack. Local social media reports of achemical attack in the Damascus suburbs began at 2:30 a.m. local time on August21. Within the next four hours there were thousands of social media reports onthis attack from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area. Multipleaccounts described chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlledareas. Three hospitals in the Damascusarea received approximately 3,600 patients displaying symptoms consistent withnerve agent exposure in less than three hours on the morning of August 21,according to a highly credible international humanitarian organization. Thereported symptoms, and the epidemiological pattern of events � characterized bythe massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of thepatients, and the contamination of medical and first aid workers � wereconsistent with mass exposure to a nerve agent. We also received reports frominternational and Syrian medical personnel on the ground.4 Wehave identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many of which showlarge numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but notunique to, nerve agent exposure. The reported symptoms of victims includedunconsciousness, foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapidheartbeat, and difficulty breathing. Several of the videos show what appear tobe numerous fatalities with no visible injuries, which is consistent with deathfrom chemical weapons, and inconsistent with death from small-arms, high-explosivemunitions or blister agents. At least 12 locations are portrayed in thepublicly available videos, and a sampling of those videos confirmed that somewere shot at the general times and locations described in the footage. We assess the Syrian oppositiondoes not have the capability to fabricate all of the videos, physical symptomsverified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other information associated withthis chemical attack. We have a body of information,including past Syrian practice, that leads us to conclude that regime officialswere witting of and directed the attack on August 21. We interceptedcommunications involving a senior official intimately familiar with theoffensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August21 and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On theafternoon of August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weaponspersonnel were directed to cease operations. At the same time, the regimeintensified the artillery barrage targeting many of the neighborhoods wherechemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour period after the attack, we detectedindications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate approximately four timeshigher than the ten preceding days. We continued to see indications ofsustained shelling in the neighborhoods up until the morning of August 26. To conclude,there is a substantial body of information that implicates the Syriangovernment�s responsibility in the chemical weapons attack that took place onAugust 21.As indicated, there is additional intelligence that remainsclassified because of sources and methods concerns that is being provided toCongress and international partners. https://www.facebook.com/notes/us-em...51628295621938 |
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